

the objectionable publication by Aviation-Week).

In particular, the number of bombs carried in the mission are the same for Fl. E and F. 16, not less as reported in the Report of the Steering Committee and erroneously repeated in the "Yellow Book".

b) *Biased.*

Since the assumptions taken for assessment were not founded on the operational requirement (non-existent) but on the conditions most favorable to the F. 16.

c) *Uncomplete.*

Since essential features are completely absent, namely on:

Fatigue,

(although the necessity for the Starfighter replacement in the first place is due to fatigue problems plaguing this US equipment). (It also being the case for the NF. 5).

Armament.

Since the Steering Committee specified 1965 type of armament for a 1985 aircraft that they, furthermore, want most advanced.

Low altitude capability, and vulnerability though the priority mission for the RNLAF is low altitude strike.

Versatility, although the objective of the RNLAF is for a "Standard Fighter" having multi-role capability and since versatility is an essential feature against operational obsolescence.

It is mandatory, in order to properly evaluate the drawbacks of the F. 16 concept to read the Report produced by the US Navy in their evaluation of the F. 16.

It is our contention that the Fl. E Weapon System with its 30 mm canons and advanced air to air missiles has a higher over all capabilities than the F. 16 which is, by reason of the US requirement, an aircraft highly specialized for medium (30 000 ft) altitude air to air roles.

Section 2. — Weapon System procurement cost.

The cost comparison in the "Yellow Book" is based upon conditions of basic price currency and economic conditions supposedly prevailing at 16 May 1975, though the com-

parison was supposed to be based upon January 1975 conditions.

The cost comparison made is biased and erroneous,

a) *Biased.*

Since obviously, the further downrating of the US \$ from January to May 1975 combined with the climb of the French Franc is temporarily — unfavorable to the Fl. E offer.

Biased since it deliberately disregards the French officially communicated offer to reduce the price.

Nota. — We cannot accept the Statement of the "Yellow Book" that "the French proposal was too late, unclear and subject to the prior choice in principle of the Fl. E" since: — It was made on 18 April 1975 and the Dutch decision was made on 23 May 1975, on the basis of "clarifications" by the US reflected in the M.O.U.—negotiated at least until May 17, 1975.

— If clarifications were needed they could have been requested since so at the same time clarification were requested from the US.

— Apparently prior selection was possible since this was made for the US aircraft in entering into final negotiations with only the US.

b) *Erroneous.*

Since, even on the unfavorable conditions of the 16 May 1975, the true figure for 102 Fl. E/D in agreement with all conditions stated as correctly interpreted is a total procurement cost of,

Fl. 2 495 Million (VAT included)
as against a budget of Fl. 2 448 Million—a minus difference which certainly can be settled and which any way is well within the accuracy of the budget computation.

It is our contention that the Fl. E is compatible with the Budget established for the purchase of 102 aircraft, even in the most unfavorable conditions purposefully selected for the "Yellow Book". The small difference with the F. 16 budget can be reversed overnight by US \$ fluctuation.

It is reported in details in the "Yellow Book" that the Netherlands Ministry of Defense has made provisions for a reduction